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The Litigation Privilege in Texas 
Abstract.  Certain Texas cases have arisen where one party in litigation 
sues the attorney representing an opposing party.  In response to such cases, 
Texas courts promulgated a judicial doctrine generally referred to as the 
litigation privilege or qualified immunity in order to protect litigants’ right to 
zealous representation from their attorney.  The general rule is that one party 
to a lawsuit cannot sue the other party’s attorney.  However, exceptions to this 
doctrine exist.  This Article explores the contours of the litigation privilege in 
Texas by analyzing the primary Texas cases where one party’s claim against the 
opposing party’s attorney was dismissed based on the litigation privilege and 
discussing relevant Texas cases where the court found an exception to the 
litigation privilege, therefore allowing one party in litigation to sue an 
opposing party’s attorney. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
In Texas litigation, the following scenario has occurred on a fairly 
regular basis: Attorney 1 represents Client X in a dispute with opposing 
party Y.  Opposing Party Y becomes upset with actions by Attorney 1.  
Even though Attorney 1 does not represent Opposing Party Y (and instead 
only represents Client X), Opposing Party Y sues Attorney 1.  Hereafter, 
this is referred to as the “Party Suing the Opposing Attorney Scenario.” 
The Party Suing the Opposing Attorney Scenario gives rise to a 
surprisingly large number of Texas cases.  These cases address if and when 
one party can sue the opposing party’s attorney.  The purpose of this 
Article is to address and analyze these cases. 
II.     UNDER THE TEXAS LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, AN OPPOSING PARTY 
GENERALLY CANNOT SUE THE OPPOSING PARTY’S ATTORNEY 
As a general rule, Texas courts frown on a non-client suing an attorney.1  
For example, in Texas, a non-client cannot sue an attorney for negligence.2  
In fact, in the estate-planning context, if a lawyer makes a mistake in 
drafting a will that causes the will to fail, the intended beneficiaries who 
would have otherwise taken under the failed will cannot sue the lawyer for 
negligence because those intended beneficiaries were not the attorney’s 
clients.3  In refusing to allow a non-client intended will beneficiary to sue 
the attorney who negligently drafted the will, Texas adopted the minority 
view.4 
 
1. See Helen Bishop Jenkins, Privity—A Texas-Size Barrier to Third Parties for Negligent Will 
Drafting—An Assessment and Proposal, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 697–98 (1990) (“Courts in . . . 
Texas still regard the privity barrier as a bar to recovery by the third party will beneficiary.”); Brian J. 
Davis, Comment, Lawyers’ Negligence Liability to Non-Clients: A Texas Viewpoint, 14 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
405, 408–09 (1983) (noting that Texas still follows the Supreme Court ruling of non-liability to 
parties in Savings Bank v. Ward who lack privity of contract. 
2. Cf. Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison, & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. 2006) 
(listing the requirements a plaintiff must prove for negligence and noting attorneys do not owe any 
duty to non-client beneficiaries). 
3. E.g., Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996) (“We therefore hold that an 
attorney retained by a testator or settler to draft a will or trust owes no professional duty of care to 
persons named as beneficiaries under the will or trust.”).  However, intended beneficiaries can recover 
from the attorney through a suit by the estate’s personal representative.  Belt, 192 S.W.3d at 789. 
4. See Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577 (indicating most states allow non-clients to bring suit for 
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Likewise, Texas developed a specific doctrine that prevents one party 
from suing the attorney of an opposing party under any theory if the 
attorney’s alleged wrongful actions are those that an attorney engages in 
when representing his clients.5  This doctrine is generally referred to as the 
“litigation privilege” and is sometimes called “qualified immunity.”6  The 
litigation privilege is not a statutory doctrine; instead, it is a common law 
doctrine developed by the Texas courts.7 
As discussed in detail below, the general theory behind the litigation 
privilege is that “[t]he public has an interest in ‘loyal, faithful[,] and 
aggressive representation by the legal profession.’”8  Attorneys have a duty 
to zealously represent clients “within the bounds of the law.”9  In fulfilling 
this duty, attorneys should have the right to interpose any defense and/or 
make use of any right on behalf of their clients without liability for 
damages to the opposing party.10  Texas courts hold that any other rule 
would potentially cripple the ends of justice because “a litigant might be 
denied full development of her case if her attorney were subject to the 
threat of liability” to the opposing party.11  Thus, under the litigation 
privilege, Texas attorneys can aggressively assert a client’s rights and 
defenses without being subject to a claim by an opposing party.12 
However, the litigation privilege is not absolute because it does not 
prevent all claims by one party against the opposing party’s attorney.13  
For example, assume Attorney 1 represents Client X in a trial against 
Opposing Party Y.  During the trial, Attorney 1 physically and violently 
assaults Opposing Party Y in the courtroom.  In this hypothetical, no one 
 
legal malpractice in estate planning). 
5. See Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“An attorney in Texas . . . is not liable to non-client third parties for legal 
malpractice.”). 
6. FinServ Cas. Corp. v. Settlement Funding, L.L.C., 724 F. Supp. 2d 662, 673 (S.D. Tex. 
2010); T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 
PEPP. L. REV. 915, 916 (2004). 
7. E.g., Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 405 (referring to the limits of the common law rule of privity and 
the extension of qualified immunity shielding an attorney’s conduct when representing a client in 
litigation). 
8. Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) 
(quoting Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, writ denied)). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. (quoting Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947–48 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1966, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
12. Cf. id. at 72 (disallowing litigation immunity for attorneys would result in tentative 
representation and would not serve the interests of justice). 
13. See Thomas Borton, The Extent of the Lawyer’s Litigation Privilege, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 119, 
124 (2001) (noting the litigation privilege fails in the face of unethical conduct and perjury). 
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could argue the litigation privilege should prevent opposing party Y from 
suing Attorney 1 for assault.14  As discussed in further detail below, in 
some cases, the protection an attorney receives is limited because the 
litigation privilege fails to protect an attorney from a claim by an opposing 
party who can prove the attorney’s actions were “foreign to the duties of an 
attorney.”15 
The purpose of this Article is to discuss, in chronological order, the 
primary Texas cases that have established and analyzed this litigation 
privilege.  It will first examine primary Texas cases where an attorney, in 
the Party Suing the Opposing Attorney Scenario discussed above, 
successfully asserted the litigation privilege and the courts dismissed the 
opposing party non-client’s claims.  The second part of the Article will 
discuss the primary Texas cases where an attorney in the Party Suing the 
Opposing Attorney Scenario failed to assert the litigation privilege. 
III.     SUCCESSFULLY ASSERTING THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE AGAINST A 
CLAIM BY A NON-CLIENT OPPOSING PARTY 
What follows is a discussion of Texas cases where a Texas attorney 
successfully asserted the litigation privilege against a claim asserted by an 
opposing party who was not a client. 
A. Kruegel v. Murphy 
Kruegel16 marks the first time a Texas court dismissed a claim against an 
attorney brought by a non-client opposing party.17  Kruegel arose from an 
underlying case18 involving fraudulent commercial activities, where the 
court rendered judgment against the plaintiff.19  Upon losing his original 
case, the plaintiff brought an action for wide-ranging conspiracy to defraud 
his claims against the prevailing defendants, as well as against particular 
judges, court clerks, and opposing attorneys also involved in the 
 
14. See T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 
31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 937 (2004) (“Courts also reject the application of the litigation privilege when 
the conduct in question had no apparent connection at all to furthering the lawsuit.”); Thomas 
Borton, The Extent of the Lawyer’s Litigation Privilege, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 119, 125 (2001) (noting 
the litigation privilege does not extend to excuse criminal conduct). 
15. Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882). 
16. Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref’d). 
17. Jason D. Pinkall, Comment, From Barcelo to McCamish: A Call to Relax the Privity Barrier 
in the Estate-Planning Context in Texas, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1275, 1277 n.9 (2000). 
18. Kruegel, 126 S.W. at 343. 
19. Id. at 343–44. 
JOHNSON_FINAL 6/3/2013  11:01 AM 
2013] The Litigation Privilege in Texas 169 
underlying case.20  The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on 
special exceptions.21  The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.22  
Addressing the attorney-defendants, the court stated: “The attorneys are 
authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose 
any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for 
damages.”23  This statement sets out one of the primary reasons for the 
litigation privilege.24  Texas courts believe attorneys should be given the 
ability to advise their clients and raise any defense without exposing 
themselves to liability to the opposing party and that any other role would 
lead to tentative representation by the attorneys.25 
B. Morris v. Bailey 
In Morris v. Bailey,26 the plaintiff brought an action for damages against 
an assistant attorney general in Texas alleging willful and consistent abuse 
of litigation and delays in litigation related to multiple cases involving the 
plaintiff and the state’s attorney general.27 
In Morris, the attorney-defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment, and the trial court granted the motion.28  Subsequently, the 
court of appeals affirmed.29  The court of appeals concluded attorneys do 
not typically owe a duty to the clients of opposing attorneys because 
attorneys’ authority and competency should be focused on defending their 
respective clients and asserting their clients’ rights without concern for 
liability to adverse parties.30  Further, the court reasoned the attorney 
 
20. Id. at 345. 
21. Id. at 343. 
22. Id. at 344–45. 
23. Id. at 345. 
24. Compare FinServ Cas. Corp. v. Settlement Funding, L.L.C., 724 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671–72 
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (listing Texas cases supporting non-liability to further the public interest in zealous 
client representation), and Kruegel, 126 S.W. at 345 (“[A]ttorneys are authorized to practice their 
profession . . . without making themselves liable for damages.”), with T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute 
Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 916 (2004) 
(“Lawsuits filed against litigation lawyers by their clients’ adversaries primarily seek vengeance.”). 
25. E.g., Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 71–72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ 
denied) (citing Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947–48 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (indicating this litigation rule supports authorized zealous representation as opposed to 
hesitant representation, which would not serve the public’s best interests)). 
26. Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
27. Id. at 947. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 947–48. 
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acted entirely within the scope of his professional responsibilities in 
defending his client.31  Thus, based upon legal precedent and his authority 
as an officer of the court, the attorney was not liable for any damages to his 
adversary.  Had the court allowed an opposing party to subject another 
attorney to liability for vigorous representation of his client, clients would 
be exposed to ineffective advocacy that would cripple the judicial system.32  
Thus, Morris upheld and reiterated the litigation privilege to preserve 
judicial integrity in allowing attorneys to fully and zealously develop their 
clients’ cases without fear of liability from non-clients.33 
C. Maynard v. Caballero 
The Maynard v. Caballero34 case grew out of an underlying criminal 
prosecution whereby the federal government prosecuted three defendants 
for violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization 
Act (RICO).35  In the preceding RICO case, the government alleged that 
the defendants entered into a bribery scheme that violated the RICO 
Act.36  A federal court convicted all three defendants, which was affirmed 
on appeal.37 
Criminal Defendant 1 in the underlying RICO case subsequently sued 
the attorney for Criminal Defendant 2 for alleged tortious interference 
with contract.38  Criminal Defendant 1 contended the attorney for 
Criminal Defendant 2 wrongfully persuaded the attorney for Criminal 
Defendant 1 that the proper strategy during the trial of the underlying 
RICO case was to limit the cross-examination of the prosecution’s 
witnesses.39  Criminal Defendant 1 contended, instead, the prosecution 
 
31. See id. at 948 (finding the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure “expressly authorize” an attorney 
“to request a continuance on behalf of the party or parties he represent[s]”). 
32. Id. at 947–48.  The court reasoned: 
 
In this connection it should be noted that any other result would act as a severe and crippling 
deterrent to the ends of justice for the reason that a litigant might be denied a full development 
of his case if his attorney were subject to the threat of liability for defending his client’s position 




34. Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, writ denied). 
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witnesses should have been vigorously cross-examined and impeached at 
trial.40 
In this tortious interference with contract case, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the attorney for Criminal Defendant 2.41  
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, stating:  
  We find that [the attorney for Criminal Defendant 2’s] conduct was 
privileged.  As long as our statutes permit the joinder of parties in criminal 
and civil litigation, there is an ethical and vital need for attorneys, on behalf 
of their respective clients, to meet, discuss, compromise[,] and plan joint 
defenses or strategies.  This should be done without fear that if one or more 
of the parties are unsuccessful that the attorneys not in privity with the other 
litigants should be subject to a tortious interference with contract suit.  In 
such instances, privilege should, as a matter of law, bar recovery as long as the 
interference is done to protect one’s contract right to represent one’s own client. 
  In the RICO trial that gave rise to his lawsuit, each defendant had his 
or her own attorney.  In such instances, privilege should bar recovery of a 
suit by a dissatisfied defendant not in privity with the other attorney or 
attorneys.  If a particular client feels that he was not properly represented, his 
recourse should be against his attorney and not someone else who is not in 
privity and owes him no duty.  Otherwise, the interest of the public in loyal, 
faithful[,] and the aggressive representation by the legal profession will be 
severely hampered to the detriment of all.42  
Again, in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against the attorney, the court 
stressed the public interest in “loyal, faithful[,] and aggressive 
representation” by the attorney.43 
Maynard is particularly interesting because it is the only Texas case that 
discusses the litigation privilege in the context of a claim by one party 
against an attorney for a commonly-aligned party.  Almost all other related 
cases discuss the litigation privilege in the context of a claim by one party 
against an attorney for an opposing party. 
D. Bradt v. West 
Bradt v. West44 arises out of a series of related lawsuits involving a 
divorce and child custody dispute.45  After a federal court dismissed the 




42. Id. at 721. 
43. Id. 
44. Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). 
45. Id. at 61–62. 
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Mark Metzger, in a second case brought in state court with the same causes 
of action and the same defendants.46  In the second case, the father 
brought claims of civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution against 
numerous defendants, contending they entered into a civil conspiracy to 
assert child abuse claims against the father, which caused the father to lose 
custody of his children.47 
Metzger denied the child abuse allegations and passed a lie detector test 
concerning the allegations.48  Based upon a motion in limine, the court 
prohibited attorney Bradt from mentioning the lie detector test.49  Despite 
this, in the trial of the underlying case, attorney Bradt twice mentioned the 
fact that the father previously passed a lie detector test.50  Because Bradt 
violated the motion in limine, the defense attorneys moved for attorney 
Bradt to be held in contempt, and the court granted their motion, 
sanctioning Bradt.51 
After a federal court dismissed the third lawsuit, Bradt initiated the 
fourth lawsuit, suing numerous attorneys, witnesses, and insurance 
companies involved in the underlying case.52  Attorney Bradt alleged the 
defendants entered into a conspiracy to maliciously prosecute him for 
contempt.53  Subsequently, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment on all causes of action.54 
On appeal, the court discussed at length the public interest in “loyal, 
faithful[,] and aggressive representation by the legal profession.”55  If an 
attorney proceeded to court with the fear that opposing counsel may sue 
her for the actions taken to effectively represent her client, the result would 
be tentative representation; the public has a right to expect zealous 
representation, and an attorney has a duty to advocate on behalf of her 
client.56  The court of appeals further stated it would not be in the interest 
of justice to “dilute the vigor with which Texas attorneys represent their 
clients.”57  In fulfilling the duty to zealously represent clients within the 
 
46. Id. at 62. 
47. Id. at 60–62 (emphasis added). 
48. Id. at 62–63. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 63–64. 
52. Id. at 64–65. 
53. Id. at 65. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 71 (quoting Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, 
writ denied)). 
56. Id. at 72. 
57. Id. 
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boundaries of the law, an attorney must be able to introduce any defense 
and use any right on behalf of her client that she considers to be proper 
and necessary, without subjection to liability and damages.58 If this were 
not the rule, there would be  
a severe and crippling deterrent to the ends of justice for the reason that a 
litigant might be denied full development of his case if his attorney were 
subject to the threat of liability for defending his client’s position to the best 
and fullest extent allowed by law, and availing his client of all rights to which 
he is entitled.59  
Based on these principles, the court of appeals held “an attorney does 
not have a right of recovery, under any cause of action, against another 
attorney arising from conduct the second attorney engaged in as part of the 
discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit in which the first 
attorney also represented a party.”60  This holding is focused “on the kind 
of conduct engaged in, not on whether the conduct was meritorious in the 
context of the underlying lawsuit.”61  The law consists of mechanisms to 
punish attorneys when their actions lack merit.62 
Thus, in Bradt, the court dismissed attorney Bradt’s claims against the 
opposing attorneys because allowing such claims would hamper an 
attorney’s ability to zealously represent his client.63  In doing so, the Bradt 
court noted that the trial court in the underlying case could sanction any 
wrongful conduct by a litigant’s attorney.64 
 
58. Id. at 71 (citing Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ. App—Austin, 1966, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
59. Id. (quoting Morris, 398 S.W.2d at 947–48). 
60. Id. at 72. 
61. Id. at 71–72. 
62. Id. at 72; see, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West 2004) (sanctioning attorneys 
for contempt of court); TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (penalizing attorneys for filing improper pleadings, 
motions or other papers); id. R. 215.3 (punishing attorneys for abusing discovery).  
63. See Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 71–72, 76 (affirming summary judgment granted to attorney-
appellees).  See generally David J. Beck & Geoff A. Gannaway, The Vitality of Barcelo After Ten Years:  
When Can an Attorney Be Sued for Negligence by Someone Other Than His Client?, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 
371 (2006) (reviewing ten years of case law to find limited exceptions to the general rule that third 
parties may not sue an attorney for legal malpractice). 
64. See Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 72 (citing the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that grant trial 
courts the authority to sanction attorneys).  The Bradt decision was reaffirmed in Authorlee v. 
Tuboscope Vetco Int’l Inc., 274 S.W.3d 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).  Id. 
at 120.  The case arose when certain silica plaintiffs sued defendants for silica exposure.  Id. at 113.  
These silica plaintiffs (along with other co-plaintiffs) settled with the defendants.  Id. at 117.  Later, 
the silica plaintiffs, represented by new counsel, sought to rescind the settlement by motion for new 
trial, whereby they contended the silica plaintiffs’ original attorneys and the defendants’ attorneys 
fraudulently colluded to have the silica plaintiffs agree to an improper aggregate settlement.  Id. at 
117–18.  The trial court denied the motion for new trial and the First Court of Appeals in Houston 
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E. Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken 
Taco Bell Corp.65 arose from an incident where Jerome Green robbed a 
Taco Bell in Irving, Texas, and killed four people.66  Attorney John 
Cracken represented certain survivors of the deceased murder victims in 
Deborah R.V. Fraga, et al. v. American Sec. Prods. Co. & Jerome Green.67  
On behalf of the plaintiffs (hereafter referred to as the “Fraga plaintiffs”) in 
Duval County, Cracken sued American Security Products Company 
(ASP), the designer and manufacturer of the Taco Bell wall safe, and 
Green.68 
Attorney Douglas Parks was Green’s court appointed criminal 
counsel.69  Cracken asked Parks to represent Green in Cracken’s 
contemplated wrongful death lawsuit against Green, and Parks agreed.  
Cracken paid attorney Parks $150 an hour to represent Green in the Fraga 
case.70 
Cracken filed the Fraga case in Duval County, which is in South Texas 
and considered to be a plaintiff-friendly venue.71  At the time the Fraga 
case was filed, Green was incarcerated in Anderson County in East 
Texas.72  The events giving rise to the suit occurred in Dallas County.73  
Before his imprisonment, Green resided in Dallas County, but never in 
Duval County.74  However, in the Fraga petition, Cracken “alleged on 
information and belief . . . Green was a resident of Duval County.”75  In 
response to requests for admissions from the Fraga plaintiffs, Green 
 
affirmed.  Id. at 118.  In doing so, the First Court of Appeals specifically reaffirmed its holding in 
Bradt, holding all of the defendants’ wrongful actions were related to settling the lawsuit.  Id.  The 
court further agreed with the trial court, stating, “‘[T]here can be no conspiracy to commit fraud in 
the litigation setting.’”  Id. 
65. Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Tex. 1996). 
66. Id. at 529. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 529–30. 
69. Id. at 530. 
70. Id. 
71. See id. (noting Duvall County is “located several hundred miles from the murder scene); 
Coyt Randal Johnston & Robert L. Tobey, Legal Malpractice Update, 46 ADVOC. (TEX.), Spring 
2009, at 6, available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/46_Best_Of_Part_2.pdf 
(describing Duvall County as “a county generally perceived to be more favorable to plaintiff’s claims 
than Dallas County during the relevant time period”). 
72. Taco Bell Corp., 929 F. Supp. at 530. 
73. See id. at 529 (stating the Fraga case arose from the murder of four people at a Taco Bell in 
Irving, Texas, which is in Dallas County). 
74. Id. at 530. 
75. Id. 
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admitted he chose “Duval County as his residence.”76 
Defendant ASP moved to transfer venue to Dallas County.77  The 
Fraga plaintiffs then “entered into a ‘high-low’ settlement” with ASP that 
limited ASP’s exposure to $250,000.78  The Duval County trial court 
denied the ASP motion to transfer venue following a hearing.79 
Immediately after the state district court denied the motion to transfer 
venue, the Fraga plaintiffs sued Taco Bell in the Fraga case.80  Taco Bell 
sought to have Duval County District Court reconsider its ruling on the 
motion to transfer, but the district court denied that request.81  Taco Bell 
subsequently settled with the Fraga plaintiffs for $8,250,000.82 
Taco Bell then sued attorney Cracken, attorney Parks, and Green in this 
case in federal court in Dallas alleging “fraud, abuse of process, and 
conspiracy.”83  Taco Bell contended it incurred damages including 
attorney fees and other costs to discover and reveal the defendants’ conduct 
and to negate the allegedly harmful effects of the defendants’ venue fraud 
and abuse of the justice system.84 
Attorneys Cracken and Parks filed a motion for summary judgment 
based on the litigation privilege.85  The district court granted their motion 
for summary judgment.86  In granting this motion, the court stated as 
follows: “The knowledge of an attorney for one party that he may be sued 
by the other party would exacerbate the risk of tentative representation to 
at least the same degree as would knowledge that opposing counsel could 
sue him.”87  To allow such would create a “greater chilling effect” among 
legal professionals and force them to consider their personal exposure to 







80. See id. (“Within minutes of the ruling, Cracken filed an amended petition that named Taco 
Bell as a defendant.”). 
81. Id. 




86. Id. at 529. 
87. Id. at 532. 
88. See id. (“The court therefore predicts that Texas would apply the principles of Bradt to bar 
claims by one party against the opposing party’s attorney.”); cf. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 
771 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting courts generally hold that an 
attorney for one party is exempt from liability to a non-client party for damages resulting from the 
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In Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken, the federal court made clear it would not 
validate a non-client opposing party suing to hold attorney-defendants 
liable for actions or omissions committed merely by serving as legal counsel 
and advocating on behalf of their clients.89  “Because, under Texas law, it is 
the kind—not the nature—of conduct that is controlling, Taco Bell’s claims 
must be dismissed.”90  Thus, Judge Fitzwater dismissed Taco Bell’s claims 
because the “kind” of conduct the opposing lawyers engaged in by 
allegedly manufacturing venue in Duval County was conduct that those 
lawyers took in discharging their duties to their clients.91  As such, the 
district court held that Taco Bell could not maintain its suit against the 
lawyer-defendants.92 
F. Renfroe v. Jones & Associates 
In the underlying case, a creditor filed for a writ of garnishment against 
a debtor whom he previously obtained a judgment against.93  
Subsequently, the court granted the judgment debtor’s motion to dissolve 
the writ of garnishment.94 
In Renfroe,95 the judgment debtor filed suit against the judgment 
creditor’s attorney alleging the attorney filed a wrongful garnishment.96  
The attorneys for the judgment creditor moved for summary judgment, 
 
performance of services the attorney engages in and that require the office, professional training, skill, 
and authority of an attorney). 
89. The court further stated: 
 
Taco Bell’s claims all rest on the premise that defendants manipulated the judicial system, and 
engaged in tortious conduct, for the purpose of obtaining venue in a particular forum.  See Am. 
Compl. at 40 (complaining of representations made concerning Green’s residence and propriety 
of venue in Duval County, and those giving appearance of adversity between the Fraga Plaintiffs 
and Green); 47 (defendants made illegal, improper, or perverted use of legal process); 51 
(defendants committed wrongful acts so as improperly to place and maintain venue in Duval 
County); [and] 58 (Cracken, P.C. made misrepresentations to guide Taco Bell).  Taco Bell 
states in its brief that it seeks inter alia “to reverse the effects of [defendants’] misrepresentations, 
conspiracy, venue fraud and abuse of the legal process.”  
Taco Bell Corp., 939 F. Supp. at 532. 
90. Id. at 532–33 (emphasis added). 
91. Id.; see Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“Because under Texas law it is the kind of conduct that 
is controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable, the trial court’s decision 
to grant summary judgment . . . was proper.” (citing Taco Bell Corp., 939 F. Supp. at 532–33)). 
92. Taco Bell Corp., 939 F. Supp. at 533. 
93. Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ 
denied). 
94. Id. 
95. Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied). 
96. Id. at 286. 
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which the trial court granted.97  The court of appeals affirmed.98 
In this context, the court concluded attorneys only owe a duty to their 
clients.99  To hold attorneys liable to opposing parties would thwart the 
judicial system.100  The attorney-defendants were not “held liable for 
wrongful litigation conduct” to opposing parties.101 
Thus, the Renfroe court dismissed the wrongful garnishment claims 
against the attorney because his alleged wrongful acts were committed 
while representing the attorney’s client (the judgment creditors) in the 
underlying action.102  The court found that allowing the judgment 
debtor’s claims against the attorney to proceed would necessarily “dilute 
the vigor with which Texas attorneys represent their clients.”103  The 
court further stated that if the attorney’s conduct violated his professional 
duties, the remedy would be public and not private.104 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 286–88. 
99. See id. at 287 (“An attorney’s duties that arise from the attorney–client relationship are 
owed only to the client, not to third persons, such as adverse parties.”).  Third persons, unlike the 
client, lack privity of contract as there is no existing agreement with the attorney.  Id.  “They have no 
right of action against the attorney for any injuries they suffer because of the attorney’s fault in 
performing duties owed only to the client.”  Id. 
100. Id.  “Texas law has long authorized attorneys to ‘practice their profession, to advise their 
clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for 
damages.’”  Id. at 286–87 (citing Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 
1910, writ ref’d)). 
101. Id.  “An attorney may assert any of his client’s rights without being personally liable for 
damages to the opposing party.”  Id. (citing Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ. App—Austin 1966, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.)).  
If an attorney’s conduct violates his professional responsibility, the remedy is public, not private.  
See generally Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding physician could not recover damages from former patient’s attorneys 
based on theory that attorneys filed frivolous medical malpractice suit for patient without proper 
investigation and without informed basis of determining before filing suit that it had reasonable 
merit).  Under Texas law, attorneys cannot be held liable for wrongful litigation conduct.  See 
Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 71–72.  A contrary policy “would dilute the vigor with which Texas 
attorneys represent their clients” and “would not be in the best interests of justice.”  Id. at 72.  
Renfroe, 947 S.W.2d at 287–88. 
102. Id. at 288. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 287.  But see Mendoza v. Fleming, 41 S.W.3d 781, 788 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2001, no pet.) (finding a private cause of action against attorneys whose actions were not 
within the bounds of the law); Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (“An attorney has no general duty to the opposing party, 
but he is liable for injuries to third parties when his conduct is fraudulent or malicious.”). 
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G. Lewis v. American Exploration Co. 
Lewis105 arose from an underlying personal injury case.106  Bobby 
Lewis was injured in 1990 when a large oilrig hit the vehicle where Lewis 
was a passenger.107  The accident occurred on premises owned by 
American Exploration Company (AEC), so Lewis sued AEC in state court 
based on a premises liability theory.108 
In the state court case, Lewis asked AEC to produce any documents 
showing instructions regarding access to AEC job sites for business 
invitees.109  AEC, represented by Liddell Sapp (LS), denied possessing any 
such documents.110  An AEC employee also denied ever giving any 
instructions of that kind.111  In a companion case brought by another 
plaintiff, AEC produced documents showing AEC provided instructions to 
Lewis’s group as to what route to follow to the job site.112 
Concerning these alleged misrepresentations regarding the documents, 
Lewis proceeded to sue AEC and LS in federal court.113  AEC settled out 
of court.114  Against LS, Lewis alleged the firm committed fraud by 
refusing to produce documents and coaching their client to provide false 
testimony.115 
Based on the litigation privilege, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for LS, and the court of appeals affirmed.116  After an in-depth 
discussion of the litigation privilege, the court held:  
In this case, the Lewises challenge Liddell Sapp’s conduct in preparing 
discovery responses on its client’s behalf and in producing a client 
representative for a deposition in the Lewises’ state court case.  All the claims 
rest on the allegation that the Liddell Sapp lawyers engaged in improper 
discovery when its client denied the existence of certain documents and facts.  
The Lewises, unsuccessful state court plaintiffs, are seeking to hold Liddell 
Sapp and two of its lawyers liable for their work in discovery, work 
undertaken as part of the discharge of their duties as attorneys defending the 
party that the Lewises had sued in the same lawsuit.  Taking the Lewises’ 
 
105. Lewis v. Am. Exploration Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
106. Id. at 674. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 







116. Id. at 674–75. 
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summary judgment evidence as true for the purpose of this motion, the only 
acts and omissions alleged are acts undertaken by lawyers representing a 
client in responding to discovery requests from an opposing party.  The type 
of conduct in which the attorneys allegedly engaged is without dispute part of 
discharging their duties in representing their client.  Such conduct does not make 
the attorneys liable in tort damages to the opposing party.  Labeling such conduct 
as fraudulent or as part of a conspiracy to defraud does not subject the attorneys 
to liability for tort damages to the opposing party under Texas law.117  
Although the plaintiff alleged LS fraudulently failed to produce relevant 
documents, it was insufficient to overcome the litigation privilege.118  
Instead, the Lewis court held that because producing documents is an 
action an attorney takes in discharging her duties in representing a client, 
the attorney’s actions could not subject the attorney to liability to the 
opposing party.119 
H. Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P. 
In this case,120 in 1992, certain children’s trusts (Trusts) sued Barry 
Atkins for nonpayment of certain notes.121  “In 1994, the Trusts agreed 
to settle their claims against Atkins” (the Atkins settlement) in exchange 
for particular net proceeds Atkins hoped to receive in a separate proceeding 
against Motorola (the Motorola suit).122  The settlement provided 
Atkins’s attorneys would pay these net proceeds from the Motorola Suit, 
less attorneys’ fees and expenses, directly to the Trusts.123 
“In early 1997, Atkins agreed to accept a confidential, multi-million 
dollar settlement from Motorola” to settle the Motorola suit.124  In 
anticipation of this settlement, the Trusts issued objections to different 
expenses that were recommended by Atkins and his attorney for 
“deducting from the gross proceeds” of the Atkins settlement.125 
 
117. Id. at 679–80 (emphasis added). 
118. Id.; see T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation 
Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 922–23 (2004) (concluding the litigation privilege is in place for the 
protection of attorneys from threat of a lawsuit). 
119. Lewis, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 680; see Douglas R. Richmond, The Lawyers Litigation Privilege, 
31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 281, 287–89 (2007) (acknowledging that courts are dealing with the fact 
that not only communications, but conduct can factor into the litigation privilege). 
120. Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). 
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When resolution of this dispute was not reached, “the Trusts intervened 
in the Motorola suit.”126  Later, Motorola funded its settlement with 
Atkins and deposited $1,895,925 in the trust account of Atkins’s attorneys 
at that time, Porter & Hedges (P&H).127 
At that point, there remained a dispute between Atkins and the Trusts 
as to what amount of the $1,895,925 constituted net proceeds and should 
be paid to the Trusts.128  Subsequently, Atkins and the Trusts mediated 
this matter and agreed $1,510,000 of the $1,895,925 from Motorola 
would be paid out to the Trusts as net proceeds.129 
After this settlement, the Trusts sued Atkins’s attorney, P&H, for 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of common law 
duties.130  All of the Trusts’ claims were “based on allegedly wrongful 
acts” performed by P&H while it was allocating net proceeds from the 
settlement of the Motorola suit.131  The Trusts contended that P&H 
breached its duties to the Trusts by failing to provide supporting 
documents for the deductions from the gross proceeds, denying 
responsibility for distributing the net proceeds to the Trusts, and other 
actions concerning the money in question.132 
P&H moved for summary judgment on the Trusts’ claims.133  The trial 
court granted P&H’s motion for summary judgment.134  The Trusts then 
appealed to the court of appeals, which held:  
Taking all of the Trusts’ allegations as true, as we must, the Trusts have 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether Porter & Hedges 
was involved in assisting Atkins to perpetrate a fraud on the Trusts.  Rather, 
the allegations made by the Trusts do no more than demonstrate that Porter 
& Hedges attempted to negotiate a smaller settlement with the Trusts on 
their clients’ behalf in light of Atkin[s’] precarious financial situation.  The 
conduct complained of here, unlike the role played by the lawyer in Likover, 
involves acts or omissions undertaken as part of the discharge of Porter & 
Hedges’ duties as counsel to an opposing party.  Because under Texas law it is 
the kind of conduct that is controlling, and not whether that conduct is 








132. Id. at 441. 
133. Id. at 434. 
134. Id. 
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on the Trusts’ fraud and conspiracy claims against Porter & Hedges was 
proper.135  
Thus, Porter & Hedges again emphasized it is “the kind of conduct that is 
controlling” in these types of cases.136  If the kind of wrongful conduct 
alleged against the attorney is conduct that attorneys take in representing 
clients in litigation, that conduct will be protected even if the conduct is 
“sanctionable.”137 
I. Mitchell v. Chapman 
The Mitchell case138 involved two underlying cases where plaintiff 
Herman E. Mitchell sued an insurance company to recover disability 
benefits allegedly owed to Mitchell under an insurance policy.  Attorney 
Carlyle H. Chapman represented the insurance company.139 
In the first case, plaintiff Mitchell sought to discover certain documents 
in the insurance company’s underwriting file.140  On behalf of the 
insurance company, attorney Chapman denied that the requested 
documents existed.141  Contrary to attorney Chapman’s assertion, the 
specified documents did exist and allegedly were in attorney Chapman’s 
office.142  Further, it was undisputed that the documents in question 
would enhance the amount of disability benefits to which plaintiff 
Mitchell was entitled.143 
In the chief case, plaintiff Mitchell sued attorney Chapman alleging that 
the attorney “acted either willfully or negligently” when he denied the 
documents’ existence.144  The trial court granted summary judgment for 
attorney Chapman.145 
 
135. Id. at 442 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
136. Id.; see Steve McConnico & Robyn Bigelow, Summary of Recent Developments in Texas 
Legal Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 607, 647 (2002) (proposing that the litigation privilege 
focuses on the “type of conduct in which the attorney engages”). 
137. Chapman Children’s Trust, 32 S.W.3d at 441–42; see David J. Beck & Geoff A. 
Gannaway, The Vitality of Barcelo After Ten Years: When Can an Attorney Be Sued for Negligence by 
Someone Other Than His Client?, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 371, 373–74 (2006) (“In Texas, it is hornbook 
law that an attorney owes no duty to non-clients and will not be held liable to third parties for 
damages resulting from legal malpractice.”). 
138. Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). 
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The court of appeals affirmed, stating:  
The summary judgment turned only on whether Mitchell had a cause of 
action against Chapman.  Accordingly, we do not address whether Chapman 
had the underwriting file, as alleged, or whether Chapman acted either 
willfully, negligently, or unethically in not producing the document in 
response to discovery.  Neither do we address Chapman’s argument that 
there is another remedy available to Mitchell, by bill of review in the United 
States District Court where the earlier suits were pending.  We hold Mitchell 
does not have a cause of action against Chapman for willfully failing to 
produce the document because of the nature of their relationship in the 
earlier two suits.  Mitchell’s interests are outweighed by the public’s interest 
in loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as 
advocates.  If Chapman’s conduct violated his professional responsibility, the 
remedy is public rather than private.146  
This is the second case where a lawyer’s failure to produce documents, 
even if willful, was held not to give rise to a cause of action that could 
defeat the litigation privilege.147 
J. White v. Bayless 
The facts of White148 began when Anne H. Bayless became engaged to 
Gene White.149  During their engagement, Bayless and White together 
entered into several complicated financial investments.150  Later, Bayless 
decided against marrying White and terminated all financial investments 
with him.151  However, Bayless and White were not able to amicably 
disentangle their investments.152 
At that point, Bayless hired two attorneys, J. Anthony Guajardo Sr. and 
Matthew S. Muller (the two attorneys).153  The two attorneys, on behalf 
of Bayless, then sued Mr. White “for breach of fiduciary duty, accounting 
of funds, and recovery of investments.”154 
Mr. White then counter-claimed against Ms. Bayless and brought a 
third party claim against the two attorneys for conspiracy to defraud Mr. 
 
146. Id. at 811–12 (citations omitted). 
147. The first one was the Lewis case, discussed above.  See Lewis v. Am. Exploration Co., 4 F. 
Supp. 2d 673, 679–80 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding an attorney was not liable for failing to produce 
documents requested in discovery). 
148. White v. Bayless, 32 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). 
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White and to “destroy him financially, physically, mentally, and 
emotionally.”155  Mr. White’s claims against the two attorneys concerned 
their actions in the case, including seeking a temporary restraining order 
and writs of sequestration against White.156  Bayless and the two attorneys 
moved for summary judgment on White’s claims.157  The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the two attorneys based on the 
litigation privilege.158 
On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the summary 
judgment as to the two attorneys.  The court of appeals specifically held 
that Texas law allows attorneys to try their suit on behalf of their client 
without fear of being held personally liable for damages incurred by the 
opposing party.159  Opposing parties who incur harm because of the suit 
have no recourse against the opposing attorney who is exercising duties on 
behalf of and in furtherance of his client’s interest.160  An attorney has a 
duty only to his client’s interests.161 
The court then noted that the plaintiffs’ allegations in the present suit 
fit directly into the situation previously referenced.  The two attorneys’ 
complained of actions were performed in their capacity as attorneys 
representing Bayless.162  Because they were performing these actions in 
the context of their representation, the court held that White did not have 
a cause of action against the two attorneys.163 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 275. 
157. Id. at 273. 
158. Id. at 273–74. 
159. Id. at 275–76 (citing Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 
1910, writ ref’d)). 
160. Id. (citing Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ 
denied); Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e)). 
161. Id. at 275–76 (citing Renfroe v. Jones & Assoc., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 1997, pet. denied)).  The court continued:  
Any other rule would act as a severe and crippling deterrent to the ends of justice because a 
litigant might be denied a full development of his case if his attorney were subject to the threat 
of liability for defending his client’s position to the best and fullest extent allowed by law, and 
availing his client of all rights to which he is entitled.  
Id. at 276 (citations omitted) (quoting Morris, 398 S.W.2d at 947–48). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 275–76 (citations omitted).  
 The principle that there is no cause of action against opposing counsel for representing a client in a 
judicial proceeding focuses on the kind of conduct engaged in, not on whether the conduct was 
meritorious in the context of the underlying lawsuit.  A disgruntled litigant has no right of recovery 
against the opposing attorney for that attorney’s having made certain motions in the underlying 
lawsuit, regardless of whether the motions were meritless or even frivolous, because making 
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Thus, the White court again held that an attorney can assert any of her 
client’s rights without being held liable for damages.164  The court held an 
“attorney[] cannot be held liable for wrongful litigation conduct”165 and 
any other rule would deter an attorney from fully developing her client’s 
case.166  The court continued that even if “an attorney engages in 
wrongful conduct as part of the discharge of [her] duties in representing a 
party in a lawsuit, there is no cause of action to the party on the other 
side.”167  Finally, because all of the complained of actions committed by 
the two attorneys were made in the course of representing their clients, 
White’s (the opposing party) claims against the two attorneys were 
dismissed.168 
K. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C. 
In this case,169 attorney Mark R. Riley represented Robert Alpert.170  
Attorney Riley and Alpert experienced a falling out,171 and subsequently, 
 
motions is conduct an attorney engages in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a 
party in a lawsuit.  Even when an attorney engages in wrongful conduct as part of the discharge 
of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, there is no cause of action to the party on the 
other side. 
 Here, each of the complained of actions by Guajardo and Muller involve a pleading filed with 
or orders obtained from a court.  White does not assert he was unlawfully harmed by any single 
pleading or order; instead, he contends the pleadings and orders evidence a pattern of conspiracy 
to harm him.  However, White’s claims against Guajardo and Muller arose from Guajardo and 
Muller’s actions taken as attorneys representing their client, Bayless.  The attorneys’ preparing 
and filing various pleadings with the trial court and the bankruptcy court were within the 
context of discharging their duties in representing their client.  Guajardo and Muller owed no 
duty to White.   
Id. at 276 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
164. The court stated: “We hold that White does not have a cause of action against Guajardo 
and Muller because the relationship was adversarial and the attorneys owed no legal duty to White.”  
Id. at 276–77. 
165. Id. at 276 (citing Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 71–72); Steve McConnico & Robyn Bigelow, 
Summary of Recent Developments in Texas Legal Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 607, 647 
(2002). 
166. White, 32 S.W.3d at 276. 
167. Id.  But see Dixon Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Greenberg, Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C., No. 
01-06-00696-CV, 2008 WL 746548, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 20, 2008, pet. 
denied) (mem. op.) (“An attorney's protection from liability is not boundless.”).  For example, “[a]n 
attorney can be held liable by a third-party for actions that are not part of the discharge of his duties 
to his client.”  Id. 
168. White, 32 S.W.3d at 276–77. 
169. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2005, pet. denied). 
170. Id. at 402. 
171. Id. 
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attorney Riley sued Alpert for unpaid fees in probate court.172  In the 
probate court suit, Alpert later counterclaimed against attorney Riley.173  
Attorney Riley hired the law firm of Crain, Canton & James, P.C. (the CC 
firm) to represent him against Alpert in the probate court case.174 
Alpert then brought a separate suit against the CC firm in state district 
court alleging the firm conspired with attorney Riley to defraud Alpert.175  
Alpert also contended the CC Firm “aided and abetted, and tortiously 
interfered with[] [attorney] Riley’s fiduciary duty to Alpert.”176  Based on 
the litigation privilege, the CC firm specially excepted to Alpert’s 
claims.177  The trial court granted these special exceptions and dismissed 
Alpert’s claims against the CC firm.178  Alpert appealed.179 
The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the CC firm.180  
Concerning Alpert’s conspiracy to defraud claim, the appellate court 
stated:  
  To determine whether Alpert alleges a valid conspiracy to defraud 
action against Crain Caton, we examine the nature of the complained-of 
conduct.  In his appeal, Alpert contends the following allegations support his 
conspiracy to defraud claim: Crain Caton assisted Riley in denying that he 
served as legal counsel for Alpert; Crain Caton filed numerous lawsuits 
against Alpert on Riley’s behalf in order to conceal improper actions and to 
deflect attention away from Riley’s own wrongful conduct; Riley, while 
represented by Crain Caton, alleged that Alpert committed bad acts in order 
to force Alpert to accede to demands for money; Crain Caton aided Riley in 
concealing the fact that he had reported Alpert to the IRS; Crain Caton 
aided Riley in misusing confidential information by filing lawsuits, 
complaints and other allegations; Crain Caton aided Riley in his falsely 
stating that some of the trusts had no loans; and Crain Caton aided Riley in 
his claims that certain loans of the trusts were taxable gifts. 
  We hold that none of these alleged acts constitutes conduct “foreign to 
the duties of an attorney” in the representation of a client.  Instead, the 
complained-of actions involve the filing of lawsuits and pleadings, the 
providing of legal advice upon which the client acted, and awareness of 









179. Id. at 406. 
180. Id. at 408. 
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facilitate the rendition of legal services to Riley.  Such acts fall within the 
context of Crain Caton discharging its duty to represent Riley and are not 
the basis for an actionable fraud claim against attorneys for whom Alpert 
alleges neither (1) any legal privity, nor (2) any independent duty to Alpert, 
together with justifiable reliance upon any representation or act made by 
Crain Caton.181  
Thus, under Alpert, as long as the attorney’s alleged actions (i) were 
actions the attorney took in representing his client and (ii) were not actions 
“foreign to the duties of an attorney,” the claims against the attorney must 
be dismissed.182  The “foreign to the duties of an attorney” language 
originated in Poole v. Houston & T.C. Railway Co.,183 which was decided 
by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1882.184  The Poole case is discussed 
further in the next section of this Article. 
L. Chu v. Hong 
Chu185 does not directly address the Texas litigation privilege, but it 
gives insight as to how the Supreme Court of Texas, at least in 2008, 
viewed claims against opposing attorneys.186  This case arose out of a 
divorce and the sale of a donut shop.187 
In 1996, Gyu Chui Kim (Gyu) married Chong Hui Hong (Hong).188  
Hereafter, they are jointly referred to as the “Hong-Gyu couple.”  In 1997, 
the Hong-Gyu couple purchased “a donut shop in Mansfield, Texas.”189 
Marital problems later arose between the Hong-Gyu couple and Hong 
eventually filed assault charges against Gyu.190  “At about the same time, 
they both signed a contract to sell the donut shop for $180,000 to another 
couple, Myong Nam Kim and Kyon S. Kim ([]the Kims[]).”191  
The closing date on this sale passed with no action.192  At that point, 
 
181. Id. at 407–08. 
182. Id. at 408; see Alpert v. Riley, No. H-04-CV-3774, 2008 WL 304742, at *14 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 31, 2008) (mem. op.) (“Under Texas law, attorneys are generally not liable to a third party for 
actions taken in connection with representing a client.”). 
183. Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134 (1882). 
184. Id. at 137. 
185. Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. 2008). 
186. See id. at 446 (“We are especially reticent to open the door to such claims here against an 
opposing party’s attorney.”). 
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“the Kims stopped payment on their $20,000 down[] payment check” to 
purchase the donut shop.193  Hong and Gyu sent the Kims a letter 
demanding performance of the down payment and threatening criminal 
charges.194 
Later, the Kims hired attorney William Chu.195  Attorney Chu 
demanded that the Hong-Gyu Couple perform on the donut shop sale 
contract within four days.196  “A few days later, Gyu appeared alone at 
[attorney] Chu’s office and agreed to close the sale.”197  Gyu then signed a 
bill of sale that represented he was the lawful owner of the donut shop.198  
In return for the donut shop, the Kims paid Gyu the $180,000 purchase 
price with “$90,000 in cash and checks,” a $46,668.29 note, and assumed 
a note for the remaining amount the Hong-Gyu couple still owed on the 
shop.199 
After Gyu received the funds from the sale, he wired the money to his 
family in South Korea and filed for divorce from Hong.200  In response to 
Gyu’s divorce petition, Hong counterclaimed against Gyu for defrauding 
the community estate from the proceeds of the donut shop sale201 and 
included claims against the Kims and “attorney Chu for conversion and 
conspiracy.”202  When Gyu’s “criminal assault case came to trial, [he] was 
convicted and deported from the United States.”203 
The divorce case and the fraud case were tried together.204  The jury 
answered all questions in Hong’s favor.205  The final judgment of the trial 
court (i) granted the divorce, (ii) declared the donut shop sale void and 
declared that the Kims turn over the equipment and premises of the donut 
shop to Hong, (iii) allowed Hong and Gyu to keep any community 
property in their possession, and (iv) ordered that Gyu pay Hong $65,000 
in attorney’s fees.206  The court also (i) assessed identical attorney’s fees 
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the Kims and attorney Chu for interest and lost profits, (iii) assessed 
$20,000 against the Kims in punitive damages, and (iv) assessed 
$1,500,000 in punitive damages against attorney Chu.207 
Only attorney Chu appealed the trial court’s judgment.208  The 
Supreme Court of Texas reversed and dismissed all of Hong’s claims 
against attorney Chu.209 
The primary holding of Chu is that, as a general rule, when one spouse 
wrongfully disposes community assets to a third party, it does not give rise 
to a claim by the other spouse against that third party.210  The proper 
claim in this situation would be a claim by Hong against Gyu for wrongful 
disposition of community assets.211  Such a claim should be considered by 
the court in deciding how to divide the community property among the 
Hong-Gyu couple.212 
The Chu court went on to hold that, as a general rule, a third party 
cannot “be held liable in tort when community property is taken by one of 
the spouses” from another spouse.213  This was the primary basis the court 
relied on in dismissing the claims against attorney Chu.214 
Although this holding does not directly impact the litigation 
privilege,215 the court made important statements that affect suits by one 
party against an opposing party’s attorney.216  The court stated:  
We are especially reticent to open the door to such claims here against an 
opposing party’s attorney.  As an attorney, Chu had a fiduciary duty to 
further the best interests of his clients, the buyers; imposing a second duty to 
the sellers would inevitably conflict with the first.  An attorney who 
personally steals goods or tells lies on a client’s behalf may be liable for 
conversion or fraud in some cases.  But there are no such allegations here; the 




209. Id. at 447. 
210. See id. (“Because Hong has no tort claim against her former husband under Texas 
community-property law, she has no conspiracy claim against Chu for conspiring in such a tort.”). 
211. See id. at 444 (suggesting a wrongful disposition suit as a resolution). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 445. 
214. See id. at 447 (dismissing the cause of action because there was no tort claim). 
215. See Jennifer Knauth, Steve McConnico & Robyn Hargrove, Legal Malpractice for 
Litigators: An Update on Recent Developments in Texas Legal Malpractice and Ethics Law, ADVOC. 
(TEX.), Spring 2008, at 15, available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/42_ 
Best_Of_Part_II.pdf (“Texas courts have protected attorneys involved in litigation against claims by 
the opposing party by fashioning a litigation privilege, sometimes referred to as ‘attorney immunity,’ 
which prevents most claims by opposing parties or attorneys.”). 
216. Chu, 249 S.W.3d at 446. 
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(although his client asked him to) because he knew one spouse was selling 
the shop without the other spouse’s consent—even though neither spouse 
was his client.  We need not approve of Chu’s ethics to hold that Schlueter 
requires Hong to seek restitution from her own husband before seeking it 
from someone else’s lawyer.217  
The foregoing quote indicates that the Supreme Court of Texas, as a 
general matter, is reluctant to allow conspiracy claims against an opposing 
attorney who is simply doing her job. 
The court went on to make an important statement concerning claims 
for conspiracy against opposing attorneys.218  The Court stated:  
Chu could only be liable for conspiracy if he agreed to the injury to be 
accomplished; agreeing to the conduct ultimately resulting in injury is not 
enough.  Viewing all the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, Chu 
knew that Gyu was selling his wife’s interest without her knowledge or 
consent.  But Gyu told the Kims the money from the sale would be used to 
pay off a loan from his parents, and the rest would be shared with Hong; 
Hong denied there was any such loan, but there was no evidence Chu or the 
Kims knew that at the time.  Conspiracy may be proved by inferences from 
circumstantial evidence, but inferring an agreement to the ultimate injury 
generally arises “from joint participation in the transactions and from 
enjoyment of the fruits of the transactions.”  As there was no evidence Chu’s fee 
depended on keeping the proceeds from Hong, there is no basis for inferring 
he intended for her to be cheated.219  
Thus, the Chu court appears to be saying that since attorney Chu’s fee 
did not depend on keeping the proceeds from the donut shop sale from 
Ms. Hong, there is no evidence that attorney Chu intended for Ms. Hong 
to be cheated; therefore, there is no viable conspiracy claim against 
attorney Chu.  This arguably means that, generally, an attorney cannot be 
sued for wrongfully conspiring to defraud an opposing party if the 
attorney’s fee does not depend on the opposing party being so defrauded. 
M. Cunningham v. Tarski 
In the suit underlying Cunningham v. Tarski,220 David Tindol was a 
majority shareholder in a small Texas corporation,221 and KC 
 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 446–47. 
219. Id. 
220. Cunningham v. Tarski, 365 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).  
221. Id. at 182. 
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Cunningham was a minority shareholder in the same corporation.222  
Cunningham and Tindol had a dispute.223  On April 27, 2006, Tindol 
allegedly terminated Cunningham’s involvement with the corporation.224 
Tindol hired attorney Mike Tarski to assist Tindol in his dispute with 
Cunningham.225  Subsequently, in the relevant case, Cunningham sued 
attorney Tarski concerning work he did on behalf of Tindol.226 
Cunningham contended that, prior to April 27, 2006, Tindol and 
attorney Tarski devised a plan to unlawfully terminate Cunningham’s 
involvement with the corporation.227  Cunningham alleged Tindol and 
attorney Tarski “discussed, agreed on[,] and each committed various 
intentional acts designed to unlawfully deprive [Cunningham] of his rights 
and interest in” the corporation.228  Specifically, Cunningham contended 
that attorney Tarski drafted and backdated certain corporate documents 
that terminated Cunningham’s interest in the corporation.229  Attorney 
Tarski then transmitted these documents to Tindol.230 
In the main case, Cunningham sued attorney Tarski “for negligent 
misrepresentation and assisting, participating in, and conspiring to commit 
shareholder oppression and breach of fiduciary duties.”231  Attorney 
Tarski filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court 
granted.232  Cunningham then appealed to the Dallas Court of 
Appeals.233 
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for 
attorney Tarski and in doing so, the court stated:  
Generally, “[a] lawyer is authorized to practice his profession, to advise his 
clients, and to interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making 
himself liable for damages.”  However, a lawyer’s protection from liability 
claims arising out of representation of a client is not without limits.  “When 
an attorney acting for his client participates in fraudulent activities, his 






226. Id. at 182–83. 




231. Id. at 181. 
232. Id. at 182. 
233. Id. 
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he knowingly commits a fraudulent act that injures a third person or 
knowingly enters into a conspiracy to defraud a third person.”234  
In affirming the summary judgment for attorney Tarski, the 
Cunningham court held that simply sending corporate documents to an 
opposing party could not be a fraudulent representation.235  The court 
held that simply sending such documents to an opposing attorney was not 
conduct that was “foreign to the duties of an attorney,” and as such, 
Cunningham’s claims were properly dismissed.236 
IV.     LIMITS ON THE TEXAS LITIGATION PRIVILEGE 
As illustrated in the preceding section, there are numerous Texas cases 
that, based on the litigation privilege, dismissed claims by one party against 
an opposing party’s attorney.237  Still, the Texas litigation privilege does 
 
234. Id. at 186 (citations omitted). 
235. Id. at 191–92. 
236. See id. (rejecting Cunningham’s argument that “the trial court erred by concluding there 
was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tarski’s conduct was ‘the type of fraudulent 
conduct that is foreign to the duties of an attorney’”). 
237. See Lewis v. Am. Exploration Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (“The type of 
conduct in which the attorneys allegedly engaged is without dispute part of discharging their duties in 
representing their client.  Such conduct does not make the attorneys liable in tort damages to the 
opposing party.  Labeling such conduct as fraudulent or as part of a conspiracy to defraud does not 
subject the attorneys to liability for tort damages to the opposing party under Texas law.”); Taco Bell 
Corp. v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (reasoning that permitting an attorney to 
recover from an opposing attorney would encourage timid representation rather than the zealous 
advocacy that is expected in Texas); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76 (affirming summary judgment 
because “[a]n attorney has no right of recovery, under any cause of action, against another attorney 
arising from conduct the second attorney engaged in as part of the discharge of his duties in 
representing a party in a lawsuit in which the first attorney also represented a party”); Chu v. Hong, 
249 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex. 2008) (expressing reluctance to “open the door to such claims against an 
opposing party’s attorney” when there are more appropriate parties from which to first seek 
restitution); Cunningham, 365 S.W.3d at 191–92 (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that “there 
was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tarski’s conduct was ‘the type of fraudulent 
conduct that is ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney’”); Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 
S.W.3d 398, 405 (“[T]o promote zealous representation, courts have held that an attorney is 
‘qualifiedly immune’ from civil liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection 
with representing a client in litigation.”); Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 
S.W.3d 429, 440 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (stating that exposing 
attorneys to liability in damages “‘would act as a severe and crippling deterrent to the ends of justice 
for the reason that a litigant might be denied a full development of his case if his attorney were 
subject to the threat of liability for defending his client’s position to the best and fullest extent 
allowed by law, and availing his client of all rights to which he is entitled’” (quoting Bradt, 892 
S.W.2d at 71)); White v. Bayless, 32 S.W.3d 271, 275–76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. 
denied) (affirming that Texas attorneys may zealously advocate for their clients, without fear of 
liability to opposing clients or counsel); Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (holding a party’s claims against an opposing attorney “are outweighed by 
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have some limits. 
As discussed below, there are certain Texas cases that allowed claims by a 
party to go forward against an opposing attorney despite the litigation 
privilege.238  Generally, as the following section will show, these cases 
were allowed to proceed because: 1) there was some substantial evidence 
the defendant attorney committed affirmative fraud against the plaintiff; 
and/or 2) there was some substantial evidence that the defendant attorney’s 
actions were clearly “foreign to the duties of an attorney.”  The following 
section of the Article discusses these Texas cases. 
A. Poole v. Houston & T.C. Railway Co. 
Poole is the first Supreme Court of Texas case to address the limits of 
what would later be identified as the litigation privilege.239  Poole arose in 
1875 when a seller, W. E. Poole out of Galveston, sold thirteen cases of 
boots and shoes to a buyer out of Marlin, Texas, named La Prelle & Bro. 
(LPB).240  Upon the sale, Poole put the cases on a train to Marlin for 
delivery to LPB.241  Shortly thereafter, Poole learned that the buyer, LPB, 
was insolvent so Poole then telegraphed his attorney in Marlin to stop the 
delivery of the cases to LPB.242 
However, LPB learned of Poole’s actions concerning the cases and 
assigned their LPB bill of lading for the goods to their attorney, J. L. 
Scott.243  Then, Scott obtained possession of the goods in transit, erased 
the LPB name from the cases, inserted the name of J. L. Scott & Co. and 
 
the public’s interest in loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as 
advocates” (citing Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 71)); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287 
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (“An attorney’s duties that arise from the attorney–client 
relationship are owed only to the client, not to third persons, such as adverse parties.”); Maynard v. 
Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, writ denied) (finding attorney’s actions 
were privileged because joinder statutes in civil and criminal cases create “an ethical and vital need for 
attorneys, on behalf of their respective clients, to meet, discuss, compromise and plan joint defenses 
or strategies”); Morris v. Bailey, 398 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (“[T]he [attorney] had the right to interpose any defense or supposed defense and make use of 
any right in behalf of such client or clients as [he] deemed proper and necessary, without making 
himself subject to liability in damages to the appellant.”); Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.) (“[A]ttorneys are authorized to practice 
their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without 
making themselves liable for damages.”). 
238. Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882). 
239. Id. at 134. 
240. Id. at 135, 137. 
241. Id. at 135. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 137. 
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reshipped the cases on a different bill of lading.  The cases were ultimately 
delivered to LPB in this manner.244 
Accordingly, Poole sued the railroad company, Scott, and LPB.245  The 
case was tried and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants; Poole 
appealed.246 
In this case, attorney Scott contended that because he was acting as an 
attorney, he could not be held liable to Poole.247  The Texas Supreme 
Court rejected this contention:  
Having assumed the apparent ownership of the goods, for the purpose and 
with the intention of consummating the fraud upon appellant, [attorney 
Scott] will not be heard to deny his liability to appellant for the loss 
sustained by reason of his wrongful acts, under the privileges of an attorney 
at law, for such acts are entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney; neither will 
he be permitted, under such circumstances, to shield himself from liability 
on the ground that he was the agent of LPB, for no one is justified on that 
ground in knowingly committing [willful] and premeditated frauds for 
another.  In this particular the charge of the court was clearly erroneous.248  
Based on this logic, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.249 
In Poole, the court indicated that, even though Scott was an attorney, 
Scott could not on that basis assert a privilege from liability because his 
actions were “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.”250  In other 
words, it appears that if an attorney’s actions are “entirely foreign to the 
duties of any attorney,” the attorney may not be able to rely on her status 
as an attorney to shield her from liability.251 
As discussed below, subsequent Texas cases have used this “foreign to 
the duties of an attorney” language to limit the applicability of the 




246. Id. at 135. 
247. See id. at 137 (rejecting attorney’s denial of “liability to appellant for the loss sustained by 
reason of his wrongful acts, under the privileges of an attorney at law”). 
248. Id. at 137–38 (emphasis added). 
249. Id. at 139. 
250. Id. at 137. 
251. Id.; see Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “Non-Clients”: Reconceptualizing 
the Attorney–Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 
S.C. L. REV. 659, 659 (1994) (“Under the traditional approach to legal malpractice, an attorney is 
liable for negligence only to a client, with whom the attorney is in a privity relationship.  Thus, an 
attorney’s duties to non-clients are limited primarily to the avoidance of intentional wrongs.”). 
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B. Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd. 
Likover252 arose out of a complicated set of real estate transactions 
where a seller conveyed a piece of property to a purchaser.253  To cure a 
defect in title that occurred in the original conveyance, the seller and 
purchaser reached an agreement whereby the purchaser would re-convey 
the property to the seller; thereafter, the seller would properly convey the 
property back to the purchaser.254  Subsequently, the purchaser signed a 
deed re-conveying the property to the seller.255  However, the seller, based 
upon the advice of his attorney, Sanford Likover, refused to re-convey the 
property to the purchaser unless the purchaser paid the seller an additional 
$400,000.256 
The purchaser sued the seller and Likover for fraud.257  The jury found 
against both the seller and Likover, determining they had “engaged in a 
civil conspiracy to defraud” the purchaser.258 
Likover argued his actions were in the capacity of an attorney 
representing his client and—as a matter of law—he owed no duty to non-
client third parties like the purchaser; thus, he could not be held liable.259  
The court of appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the jury findings 
against the attorney-defendant.260  The court stated:  
  An attorney has no general duty to the opposing party, but he is liable 
for injuries to third parties when his conduct is fraudulent or malicious.  He is 
not liable for breach of duty to the third party, but he is liable for fraud. 
  A lawyer is authorized to practice his profession, to advise his clients, 
and to interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making himself 
liable for damages. 
  However, an attorney is liable if he knowingly commits a fraudulent act 
that injures a third person, or if he knowingly enters into a conspiracy to 
 
252. Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1985, no writ). 
253. Id. at 469. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 471. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 472; see Steve McConnico & Robyn Bigelow, Summary of Recent Developments in 
Texas Legal Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 607, 610–11 (2002) (“Generally, in the absence of 
privity, an attorney owes no duty to third party non-clients.  Thus, persons outside the attorney–
client relationship have no cause of action for injuries sustained due to an attorney’s malpractice.”); 
Lief Kjehl Rasmussen, Note, Abolishing the Privity Doctrine in Texas—Just Do It!, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 559, 565–66 (1996) (discussing the harm the privity doctrine can cause third party non-
clients and the arguments supporting the privity doctrine). 
260. Likover, 696 S.W.2d at 469. 
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defraud a third person.  Over 100 years ago, the Supreme Court of Texas held 
that where a lawyer acting for his client participates in fraudulent activities his 
action in so doing is “foreign to the duties of an attorney.”  The [c]ourt held that 
a lawyer cannot shield himself from liability on the ground that he was an 
agent, because no one is justified on that ground in knowingly committing a 
willful and premeditated fraud for another.261  
Thus, the court affirmed the judgment against Likover.262  The court held 
that, despite the litigation privilege, an attorney may be liable to an 
opposing party if the attorney’s conduct is fraudulent because such 
conduct is “foreign to the duties of an attorney.”263 
C. Miller v. Stonehenge/FASA-Texas, JDC, L.P. 
In this case,264 Stonehenge obtained a $23,600,000 judgment against 
Vance Miller.265  Attorney Brenda Collier represented Stonehenge in their 
collection efforts against Vance Miller.266  Stonehenge subsequently 
obtained a writ of execution and an order in aid of execution, which 
allowed Stonehenge to seize all non-exempt property at Miller’s 
residence.267 
Collier and two federal marshals visited the Miller residence to execute 
the writ.268  At that time, Miller’s wife Geraldine Miller was at home 
while he was out.269  Geraldine objected to Collier’s actions in searching 
the home for property to seize.270  Collier allegedly “demanded access to 
the premises and, under threat of force, inspected, inventoried, and 
videotaped [Geraldine’s] personal and intimate property and effects.”271  
Collier also allegedly “accosted” Geraldine when she attempted to leave the 
house by telling Geraldine she could not leave and demanding to know 
where Geraldine was going.272 
Geraldine subsequently sued Collier “for abuse of process, invasion of 
 
261. Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
262. Id. at 469. 
263. See id. at 472 (holding “that where a lawyer acting for his client participates in fraudulent 
activities, his action in so doing is ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney’” (quoting Poole v. Hous. & 
T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882))). 
264. Miller v. Stonehenge/FASA-Texas, JDC, L.P., 993 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 






271. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
272. Id. 
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privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and civil 
rights violations.”273  Attorney Collier moved for summary judgment 
based on the litigation privilege.274 
After an in-depth discussion of the litigation privilege, the federal 
district court denied Collier’s motion for summary judgment.275  The 
court declared Collier’s actions while serving a writ of execution were not a 
part of her duties as an attorney.276  “Counsel for the judgment creditor is 
not an anticipated or essential participant in this process.”277  Although 
Collier was entitled to be present, her duties did not require 
participation.278  “[H]er skills as an attorney had no role in the events that 
transpired.”279  Because the court found Collier’s alleged wrongful actions 
were not taken in “performing . . . professional duties,” Collier was not 
entitled to the protection of the litigation privilege.280  Thus, under 
Miller, if an attorney’s alleged wrongful actions are not actions related to 
“performing . . . professional duties,” then such actions may not be 




275. Id. at 465. 
276. See id. (“[T]he allegations against Collier do not involve the type of conduct that requires 
‘the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney.’  Plaintiff [] sued Collier for her 
actions regarding the writ of execution.  The U.S. Marshal is responsible for serving the writ.  
Counsel for the judgment creditor is not an anticipated or essential participant in this process.” 
(citations omitted)). 
277. Id. 
278. See id. (disregarding the argument and stating, “Collier . . . was authorized to participate 
in the execution of the writ by court order.  However, this does not imbue the process with any 
additional significance.”). 
279. Id. 
280. See id. (explaining a lack of privity between an attorney and a plaintiff does not bar suits 
based upon an attorney’s actions that are not related to performance of their professional 
responsibilities).  But see FinServ Cas. Corp. v. Settlement Funding, L.L.C., 724 F. Supp. 2d 662, 
673–74 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (refusing to find an exception to the litigation privilege that would allow 
plaintiff’s suit against the attorney).  Contrary to Miller, the court in FinServ stated:  
If the attorney’s execution of the writ is in error, the aggrieved party has a cause of action against 
the judgment creditor for wrongful execution, but not against the attorney.  Since the execution 
of writs frequently involves disputed transfers of property, and since clients frequently work with 
attorneys to execute writs, it can be expected that if there were an exception to qualified 
immunity for conspiracies to commit wrongful execution, plaintiffs could—and almost certainly 
would—bring such claims against the attorneys in virtually every case in which wrongful 
execution was pled.  Since [plaintiff] has not shown that any Texas court has declared that such 
an exception exists, the court must conclude that no such exception exists.  
Id. at 676. 
281. Miller, 993 F. Supp. at 465. 
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D. Querner v. Rindfuss 
This case282 arose when a mother died leaving a fairly substantial estate 
that, according to the mother’s will, was to be divided between her two 
children: Thera and Jimmie Querner.283  The mother’s will appointed a 
woman named Zinn as the executor.284  In probating the estate, Zinn was 
represented by attorney James A. Rindfuss.285 
Subsequently, major inconsistencies surfaced between accountings filed 
by executor Welda Gay Zinn and the corresponding checks written during 
the administration of the estate.286  Inconsistencies related to medical bills 
were also found.287  Jimmie and Thera sued executor Zinn.288  Pursuant 
to a settlement, a judgment for Thera and Jimmie of $250,000 in actual 
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages was awarded against executor 
Zinn.289 
Thera and Jimmie sued Zinn’s attorney, Rindfuss, for “civil 
conspiracies, fraud, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, DTPA, 
constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties.”290  Rindfuss moved 
for summary judgment contending he never represented Thera and Jimmie 
and that he instead represented executor Zinn in contested litigation 
against Thera and Jimmie.291  Based on the litigation privilege, the trial 
court granted summary judgment for Rindfuss.292 
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment and 
remanded the claims for trial.293  The court stated:  
  If an attorney acting for his client participates in fraudulent activities, 
his action is “foreign to the duties of an attorney.”  An attorney, therefore, is 
liable if he knowingly commits a fraudulent act or knowingly enters into a 
conspiracy to defraud a third person.  Even in the litigation context, a lawyer 
cannot shield himself from liability on the ground that he was an agent 
because no one is justified on that ground in knowingly committing a willful 
 
282. Querner v. Rindfuss, 966 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). 
283. Id. at 663. 
284. Id. at 664. 
285. See id. (“Rindfuss signed . . . documents as the attorney for the estate.”). 
286. Id. at 665. 
287. See id. (remarking that “inconsistencies between the Paragon [Healthcare] expenses set 
forth in the accountings and the actual Paragon invoices” were found and discussing the excessive line 
of credit extended to the decedent before payment was demanded from Paragon Healthcare). 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 666. 
290. Id. at 663–64. 
291. Id. at 666. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 670–71. 
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and premeditated fraud for another. 
  Rindfuss is incorrect in asserting a global privilege as to all actions taken 
in the litigation context.  Each claim must be considered in light of the 
actions . . . taken by Rindfuss in order to determine whether he can be held 
liable for such actions.  If an attorney actively engages in fraudulent conduct 
in furtherance of some conspiracy or otherwise, the attorney can be held 
liable.294  
Thus, the Querner court indicated if an attorney’s actions constitute 
fraudulent conduct in furtherance of a conspiracy, then—notwithstanding 
the litigation privilege—the attorney could potentially be held liable to the 
opposing party.295 
E. IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe 
In IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe,296 Steven Klumpe (the father) and his stepson 
Chris Escamilla (son) both worked at an IBP meat processing facility.297  
At the IBP facility, the son’s hand was injured while operating a meat 
cutter.298 
The son consulted with attorney Jeff Blackburn concerning his injury, 
and Blackburn referred the son to the Fadduol & Glasheen, P.C. law firm 
(F&G).299  On behalf of the son, F&G filed suit against IBP for the son’s 
personal injuries.300  If the son’s claim was successful, Blackburn was to 
receive a referral fee from F&G.301 
IBP possessed confidential documents called “Crewing Guides.”302  
IBP contended the Crewing Guides were trade secrets and thus immune 
from discovery.303  As a supervisor, the father had access to the Crewing 
Guides but was contractually prevented from disclosing them to third 
parties.304 
 
294. Id. at 666 (citations omitted). 
295. See McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 
793 (Tex. 1999) (noting that several jurisdictions recognize certain exceptions to the litigation 
privilege under certain circumstances). 
296. IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied). 
297. Id. at 465. 
298. Id. at 466. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 475. 
302. Id. at 466. 
303. Id.  The Texas Rules of Evidence allow discovery of trade secrets “only if necessary to 
prevent ’fraud’ or ‘injustice.’”  In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. 1998); see 
TEX. R. EVID. 507 (describing the trade secrets privilege); In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 
613 (explaining the correct application of the rule). 
304. IBP, Inc., 101 S.W.3d at 466. 
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On behalf of the son, F&G issued a deposition notice and subpoena 
duces tecum to the father.305  The subpoena duces tecum requested the 
father produce the Crewing Guides.306 
For the deposition, Blackburn represented the father as his personal 
attorney.307  The father gave attorney Blackburn copies of the Crewing 
Guides.308 
IBP filed a motion for protective order concerning the father’s 
deposition subpoena and the Crewing Guides.309  Despite this, Blackburn 
gave a copy of the Crewing Guides to F&G, the son’s attorney, as part of 
informal discovery.310  When the trial court subsequently reviewed IBP’s 
motion for protective order, the trial court held that the Crewing Guides 
could not “be disclosed to any third parties other than witnesses or 
consulting experts.”311  The son’s personal injury suit against IBP 
eventually settled during trial.312 
In Klumpe, IBP sued the father, Blackburn, and F&G for, among other 
things, an alleged unlawful conspiracy to misappropriate IBP’s trade 
secrets—the Crewing Guides.313  F&G settled out of court with IBP.314 
The father and attorney Blackburn filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on the litigation privilege.315  The trial court granted 
attorney Blackburn and the father’s motion for summary judgment; IBP 
subsequently appealed.316 
The appellate court reversed summary judgment as to the father.317  
The appellate court held fact issues existed as to whether the father illegally 
obtained the Crewing Guides from IBP and illegally disclosed them 
without IBP’s consent.318 
As to the attorney, the appellate court stated as follows:  
As a general rule, neither a party in a lawsuit nor an attorney representing a 
party in a lawsuit has a right of recovery under any cause of action against 
 
305. Id. at 470. 
306. Id. at 466. 
307. Id. at 466–67. 





313. Id. at 467–68. 
314. Id. at 466 n.1. 
315. Id. at 468. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. at 473. 
318. Id. at 473–74. 
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another attorney arising from conduct the second attorney engaged in as part 
of discharging duties in representing a party in that lawsuit.  Not every action 
taken by an attorney during the litigation process is privileged, however, and 
determining whether specific actions taken by an attorney in the litigation 
context are privileged is a fact-intensive question.  A lawyer is protected from 
liability claims only as to actions which are “within the bounds of the law.”319  
The appellate court held that attorney Blackburn could not be liable for 
sending the Crewing Guides to F&G because this disclosure was made “as 
part of discovery proceedings in pending litigation.”320  The appellate 
court further held fact issues remained as to whether Blackburn entered 
into a conspiracy to have the father unlawfully appropriate the Crewing 
Guides.321  The court stated:  
  The claim against Blackburn for faxing the Guides to Fadduol & 
Glasheen is based on his communication and disclosure of the alleged trade 
secret contents of the Guides.  As against a claim for civil liability, Blackburn 
was absolutely privileged to make such disclosure because he made the 
disclosure as part of discovery proceedings in pending litigation, even if he 
transmitted the Guides in violation of Penal Code [section] 31.05. 
  The claim against Blackburn for conspiring to have [the father] take a 
copy of IBP’s Guides, however, is not a claim based on the content of a 
communication in connection with judicial proceedings because [the 
father]’s access to the documents was not conclusively established to have 
been such lawful possession, custody or control within the meaning of the 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that his taking of them was merely an 
integral part of privileged disclosure of documents.  The summary judgment 
record before us evidences an unusual set of facts.  We agree with IBP that, 
under the record presented and summary judgment standards, a reasonable 
jury could infer that Blackburn conspired to have [the father] illegally take a 
copy of IBP’s Guides.322  
Thus, the court took a fine line with its ruling.  It held Blackburn’s 
production of the Crewing Guides to F&G was privileged because that was 
done “as part of discovery proceedings in pending litigation.”323  Despite 
this, the Klumpe court held that if attorney Blackburn unlawfully 
conspired with the father to appropriate the Crewing Guides, such action 
could give rise to a viable claim against Blackburn.324 
 
319. Id. at 470 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
320. Id. at 475. 
321. Id. at 476. 
322. Id. at 475–76 (citations omitted). 
323. Id. at 475. 
324. Id. (denying an attorney owes the client a duty of “violat[ing] a provision of the penal 
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F. Mendoza v. Fleming 
In Mendoza v. Fleming,325 Luke Fruia Investments, Inc. (LFI) obtained 
an agreed judgment against Robert Mendoza.326  “The judgment became 
final and was not paid.”327  At that point, attorney Tom Fleming, on 
behalf of LFI, secured a writ of garnishment to seize all of Mendoza’s assets 
held in the International Bank of Commerce.328 
Mendoza subsequently appealed the garnishment action to the Corpus 
Christi Court of Appeals.329  The court reversed the garnishment order 
because Mendoza was not “properly served with notice of the writ of 
garnishment.”330 
Mendoza responded by filing this suit in Cameron County against LFI, 
its attorney Fleming, and Fleming’s law firm “for wrongful garnishment, 
conversion, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and abuse of process.”331  Fleming and his law firm, as attorney-
defendants, filed a motion for summary judgment based on the litigation 
privilege.  The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment; 
Mendoza subsequently appealed.332 
In fighting the motion for summary judgment, Mendoza argued the LFI 
garnishment claim was filed for ulterior motives.333  Mendoza argued the 
garnishment claim caused him great difficulty because he was running for 
district judge and the garnishment froze his campaign account just before 
the election.334  Further, Mendoza argued the garnishment action was 
malicious and intended to harm his district judge campaign.335 
The appellate court ruled for Mendoza and reversed summary judgment 
for the attorney-defendants.336  The court stated:  
  Appellees asserted the affirmative defense of attorney immunity.  A 
lawyer is generally authorized to practice law to perform his duties as a 
lawyer without making himself liable for damages.  A contrary policy “would 
dilute the vigor with which Texas attorneys represent their clients.”  
 
code or conspir[ing] to have another do so”). 
325. Mendoza v. Fleming, 41 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). 







333. Id. at 787. 
334. Id. at 788. 
335. Id. at 786. 
336. Id. at 788. 
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However, a lawyer is immune only for actions which are “within the bounds of 
the law.”  It has long been held that where a lawyer acting for his client 
participates in wrongful activities, his action in doing so is “foreign to the duties 
of an attorney.”  An attorney is liable if he knowingly commits a fraudulent 
act that injures a third person, or if he knowingly enters into a conspiracy to 
defraud a third person.  Attorney immunity 
focuses on the type of conduct in which the attorney engages rather than 
on whether the conduct was meritorious in the context of the underlying 
lawsuit . . . [and] whether the attorney’s conduct was part of discharging 
his duties in representing his client.  If the conduct is within this context, 
it is not actionable even if it is meritless. 
  . . . . 
  We find the instant case distinguishable from Renfroe.  In Renfroe, the 
plaintiff did not allege that the attorneys had a wrongful or malicious 
motive.  In this case, appellant asserts that appellees filed the garnishment 
procedure, not merely to collect the debt appellant owed their client, but to 
wrongfully interfere with appellant’s judicial campaign.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Renfroe is not dispositive of appellant’s causes of action as a 
matter of law.337  
Thus, Mendoza seems to indicate that if the attorney-defendants filed 
the garnishment action “not merely to collect the debt,” but instead “to 
wrongfully interfere with” Mendoza’s judicial campaign, then the attorney-
defendants’ actions may not be protected by the litigation privilege.338 
G. Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter 
In the case underlying Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter,339 plaintiff 
obtained a $900,000 settlement for unpaid crane fees from two original 
defendants.340  After this settlement, the two original defendants allegedly 
hired two attorneys, Carter and Farley (the attorney-defendants), to assist 
in avoiding the plaintiff’s judgment.341 
The attorney-defendants then set up a shell company and orchestrated 
certain assignments of rights and assets to frustrate collection of the 
 
337. Id. at 787 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 
S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied)). 
338. Id.; see Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, Inc. v. Hazen, No. 03-05-00699-CV, 2008 WL 
2938823, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 29, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Whether immunity 
attaches turns on the type of conduct in which the lawyer is engaged.” (emphasis added)). 
339. Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2012, pet. denied). 
340. Id. at 370. 
341. Id. at 371. 
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judgment.342  This prompted the plaintiff to bring a separate claim 
against the attorney-defendants and the two original defendants alleging 
that they unlawfully conspired with each other to hide assets from the 
plaintiff.343 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the attorney-defendants 
based on the litigation privilege.344  The court of appeals reversed, stating:  
An attorney for an opposing party may not be held liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty or fraud merely for making representations to the opposing 
party in litigation that further the best interests of his own clients.  However, 
“[a]n attorney who personally . . . tells lies on a client’s behalf may be liable for 
. . . fraud in some cases.”  Thus, an attorney may be held liable for conspiracy to 
defraud by knowingly assisting a client in evading a judgment through a 
fraudulent transfer.  In order to be held liable for conspiracy to defraud by so 
assisting his client, however, the attorney must have agreed to the injury to 
be accomplished, not merely the conduct ultimately resulting in injury.345  
The appellate court held the plaintiff submitted enough evidence to 
raise a fact issue as to whether the attorney-defendants entered into a 
conspiracy to commit a fraudulent transfer of assets.346  Therefore, the 
court reversed the summary judgment. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the general rule based on the litigation privilege is 
one party may not sue an opposing party’s attorney.  This rule exists to 
facilitate zealous representation for clients without attorneys acting in fear 
that their actions related to representation could give rise to a claim against 
the attorney.  However, the litigation privilege in Texas is not unlimited.  
An attorney will not find protection in this doctrine if the attorney clearly 
commits fraud during the representation of a client.  If an attorney’s 
actions rise to the level of fraud against an opposing attorney or her actions 
are clearly “foreign to the duties of an attorney,”347 the litigation privilege 
will no longer act as a shield and an opposing party may be able to sue the 
attorney. 
 
342. Id. at 371–74. 
343. Id. at 371, 376. 
344. Id. at 382. 
345. Id. at 378–79 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
346. Id. at 380–81; see Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 911 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no 
pet.) (“[A]n attorney is liable if he knowingly commits a fraudulent act that injures a third person or 
knowingly enters into a conspiracy to defraud a third person.” (citing Likover v. Sunflower Terrace 
II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ))). 
347. Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882). 
